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Abstract
We present an information good pricing model with persistently heterogeneous consumers and a ris-
ing marginal propensity for them to pirate. Three offsetting pricing mechanisms occur: skimming,
compressing price changes, and delaying product launch. We identify a novel trade off in piracy’s ef-
fect on welfare. We find that piracy quickens sales times and raises welfare in fixed capacity markets,
and does the opposite in growing markets. In our model, consumers benefit from piracy except at
very high rates in rapidly expanding markets, legal sellers always dislike it, and pirate providers like
high but not very high rates. Purchase delay, transient heterogeneity, inelastic demand, and network
externalities reduce piracy’s effect, but demand uncertainty doesn’t.
1 Introduction
Information goods are typically easy to replicate at low cost, and so are susceptible to
piracy. Piracy generates no direct revenue for legal sellers, and may be considered harmful
to their interests. However, a number of papers (Givon et al., 1995, 1997; Prasad and
Mahajan, 2003; Haruvy et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2011) have suggested that piracy can
benefit legal sellers. A common theme is that piracy can act as a control on diffusion,
either to reach a certain diffusion rate or network size.
These papers include assumptions to stop piracy getting out of hand. In Givon et al.
(1995), Givon et al. (1997), Haruvy et al. (2004), and Liu et al. (2011) consumers are no
more likely to pirate in preference to buying when there are many owners or pirates than
when there is just one. In Prasad and Mahajan (2003) piracy can be varied over time by
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using a piracy protection parameter; Haruvy et al. (2004) allow for a one-time choice of
a piracy control parameter. These assumptions are important in explaining the benign
nature of piracy in the models’ dynamic analyses.
A second frequent feature of these models is the absence or transience of consumer
heterogeneity. In Prasad and Mahajan (2003) and Liu et al. (2011) the aggregate consumer
demand function does not change in response to prior prices and the valuations of previous
buyers. Haruvy et al. (2004) have identical consumers. An optimal strategy of a seller
for extracting value from such consumers cannot be based on the intertemporal price
discrimination observed in many markets for information goods (Nair, 2007; Liu, 2010).
The dynamic consequences of such skimming is absent from the models.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model in which the marginal propensity to
pirate can rise with the number of current users of an information good, while consumer
heterogeneity is persistent over time. The model is formulated as a dynamic problem
of profit maximisation by the legal seller, who controls market sales through the price.
We solve by search the problem for different propensities to pirate and other influential
variables.
Two competing impetuses occur when we consider pricing with fixed market size. The
first is to extract all surplus from the market by intertemporal price discrimination (skim-
ming) over the product lifetime. The second is to sell before piracy emerges, by reducing
prices early and heavily. As the piracy propensity or rate rises, the mean sales times falls
as the second impetus becomes more dominant and companies sell the good quicker. Total
welfare rises with the piracy rate, with consumers preferring a higher piracy rate than
pirate providers, while the pirate providers in turn prefer a much higher piracy rate than
legal sellers who want no piracy.
When we consider pricing in a market with rising capacity, the competing benefits of
skimming and piracy-evading sales acceleration remain. These behaviours occur later in
the product life than in a fixed capacity market. As the piracy rate rises, sales acceleration
again becomes more significant. However, its rise also entails more delay in product launch
so that pirates are not active too long before the market reaches its peak size. The delay
may be so protracted that the market demand is not fully met by the time the product
becomes obsolescent. Mean sales time rises slightly with piracy as the launch date and
post-launch sales time move in opposite directions. Welfare declines as piracy rises, with
consumers liking moderate to quite high rates, pirates liking quite high rates, and com-
panies preferring no piracy. Very high piracy rates are bad for everyone. We believe that
our recognition of contradictory dynamic effects is a novel addition to the literature on
welfare trade-offs due to piracy (Johnson, 1985; Novos and Waldman, 1984; Yoon, 2002;
Belleflamme, 2002; Cremer and Pestieau, 2009).
We then turn to modifying influences. Purchase delay mitigates the effect of piracy,
while rising elasticity increases it. Transient heterogeneity renders pricing immune to
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piracy’s impact, as expected, while even low network demand externalities reduce the im-
pact. Piracy continues to delay product launch if capacity growth is subject to uncertainty.
Our analysis shares with Khouja and Smith (2007) assumptions of market eroding piracy
based on lagged sales and persistent heterogeneity. Like us, they demonstrate that piracy
leads to departure from skimming. However, they use a linear demand function rather than
our general constant elasticity function, and employ algebraic solutions for pricing, rather
than our more flexible numerical solutions. They consider market contraction rather than
our market expansion, and do not study the resulting dynamic trade-off we recognise, nor
do they examine mean sales times or welfare.
Section 2 presents our model and section 3 describes the numerical analysis method.
Section 4 looks at pricing, sales time, and welfare in the presence of piracy when capacity
is fixed, while section 5 does the same when capacity is growing. Section 6 considers
modifying influences on piracy’s effect, and section 7 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Introduction
In this section, we describe our model of information good pricing in the presence of piracy.
Diffusion is divided into acquisitions from legal sellers and pirate providers. The split is
decided by competition between the two groups. Potential buyers are heterogeneous in
their valuation of the good, so that price acts as a control variable on diffusion. The
number of pirate providers rises with the number of previous buyers. Aside from pirate
entry, additional dynamics in the model are induced by emergence of market capacity
and purchase delays. Profit maximising legal sellers perform dynamic optimisation over
pricing, taking into account the dynamics within the model.
2.2 Specification
There are kl legal producers of an information good. Legal producers are profit maximising
and possess the ability to produce the information good developed from their own research
and development. The good is assumed to have been developed by the start of the time
period under consideration, so the number of legal producers is constant. In later numerical
analysis we put kl = 1. Legal producers can instantly produce copies of the good at a
constant unit cost of cl. As the cost of production can be absorbed into net price, we can
without loss of generality set cl = 0.
At time t, there are kt pirate providers of the good. Pirate providers produce copies
of the good innovated by a legal seller. They initially get the production technology by
acquiring a copy of the good from a legal seller or pirate provider. The technology may be
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as little as computer software and a DVD burner. Pirate providers are a subset of current
good users, so as the number of past acquisitions rises, the number of pirate providers
may increase too. We assume that the number of pirate providers is proportional to the
number of goods previously sold, so that kt = sSt where St is all goods sold by time t and
s is a coefficient of proportionality. Fractional numbers of pirate providers are allowed,
representing providers who are less active than legal sellers. The proportionality may
be rationalised as arising from the inherent tendency to pirate of a certain percentage of
individuals who have the opportunity to do so. Alternatively, we could reason that the
motivation to pirate rises with increased numbers of past sales. The unit cost of pirate
production is constant. We absorb it into the net price charged by pirates, so again we
can without loss of generality set production cost at zero.
The population who could have acquired the good by time t is denoted N(t). N(t)
includes people who have already acquired the good and those who have not. We may
term this population as market capacity, as they are people who will acquire the good if
they are offered it at a price below their valuation (possibly with a purchase delay), but
may not yet have been offered at such a price. N(t) can vary over time, for example with
a rise in the number of owners of a technology necessary for the information good’s usage,
such as DVD players or computers. Once the potential adopter has acquired the good,
they will not acquire it for a second time.
We denote the number of new potential buyers at time t by n(t) = N(t) − N(t − 1).
Potential buyers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the good. We discriminate
between their willingness to pay for the legally supplied and the pirate supplied good.
For the legally supplied good, the new entrants have an aggregate demand function of
q = n(t)p−a where p ≥ 1 and a > 1. Similarly, the initial consumers in the first period
have an aggregate demand function of q = N(1)p−a. In numerical analysis, we discretise
the demand function by dividing it into M equal parts n(t)/M , 2n(t)/M , . . ., n(t), with
corresponding prices p1, p2, . . ., pM . Zero demand can be obtained by setting prices
arbitrarily high. We find price pm by solving mn(t)/M = n(t)pm
−a or pm = (M/m)1/a.
We define nm(t) to be the number of new entrants with willingness to pay of pm, for
m = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1. Then nm(t) = int(n(t)/M) where int(x) denotes the integer part
of x. We take the lowest valuation when m = M as additionally including all rounding
errors, so nM(t) = n(t)−
∑M−1
m=1 nm(t). The willingness to pay of the initial consumers at
time t = 1 is similarly evenly spread. We define Cm as the number of current potential
buyers (both from new entrants and previously entered non-users) with willingness to buy
of pm.
When the unique offer price in the market is from legal sellers and is p(t), the number
of individuals valuing the good at more than p(t) is
∑
m∈mp Cm(t) where mp = {m :
(M/m)1/a ≥ p(t)}. The remainder of potential buyers is C(t)−∑m∈mp Cm(t). A proportion
q of the potential buyers purchase the good in the current period for each valuation band
4
exceeding p(t). The number of buyers in each valuation band describes the distribution of
aggregate demand and is given by
qCm(t) if (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t) (1)
0 if (M/m)1/a < p(t)
and the total number of buyers is
∑
m∈mp Cm(t).
The remainder of potential buyers delay their purchases and remain in the market.
Thus, the number of potential buyers in each valuation band who are carried over for
another period is (1 − q)Cm(t) if (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t) and Cm(t) otherwise. There are many
plausible explanations for a purchase delay. The good may not presently be required if an
older version is in use. A potential buyer may have incomplete information about market
prices, or may not process or act on them quickly. They may expect future declines in
price, or at least consider it a possibility worth acting on.
Pirate suppliers provide their good at ppirate(t). In using the pirate supplied good,
buyers choose to bring the quality up to the quality of a legally supplied good and in doing
so must pay a proportion c of the legal price p(t). We may optionally consider the price
to be equal to the cost of quality restoration, so the cp(t) is an additional deadweight loss
of pirate production. The effective price of acquiring a pirate copy of the good is thus
ppirate(t) + cp(t). Pirate suppliers price to remain competitive with legal suppliers, and set
ppirate(t) such that ppirate(t) + cp(t) = p(t), or ppirate(t) = (1− c)p(t).
As for the legally supplied good, the pirate supplied good may be bought by a proportion
q of potential buyers valuing the good at more than the offer price. The expression for the
distribution of aggregate demand is the same as inequalities 1.
Sales at any price are divided evenly between legal sellers and pirate providers. The
share of legal sales in total sales is k1/(k1 + kt), and the share of pirate sales in total sales
is kt/(k1 + kt). Hence aggregate legal sales are
kl
k1 + kt
p(t)q
∑
m∈mp
Cm(t) (2)
where mp = {m : (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t)}, and aggregate pirate sales are
kt
k1 + kt
p(t)q
∑
m∈mp
Cm(t) (3)
Legal sellers selling at the same price share sales equally, so that an individual legal
seller’s sales are
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1k1 + kt
p(t)q
∑
m∈mp
Cm(t) (4)
We assume that identical prices apply. The pricing decisions of a single legal seller
are followed by all other legal and pirate sellers; if the leader is profit maximising, then
the followers also maximise their own profits by symmetry, conditional on other sellers
following their lead.
The leader legal seller acts to maximise discounted future profits by setting a price
sequence {p(t)} for t = 1, . . . , T for some upper time limit T . They take into account
the exogenous dynamics in market capacity and purchase delay, and the endogenous dy-
namics in demand preference and pirate emergence. The legal seller is assumed to have
perfect knowledge of all parameters and future dynamics. They face a dynamic program-
ming problem whose objective function to be maximised follows from collecting the above
expressions:
T∑
t=1
dt
k1 + kt
p(t)q
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (5)
where d is the legal sellers’ discount per period, mp(t) = {m : (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t)}. The
dynamics of the number of potential buyers in each valuation band (Cm(t)) are given by
Cm(t + 1) = (1 − q)Cm(t) + nm(t) if (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t) and Cm(t + 1) = Cm(t) + nm(t)
otherwise, where nm(t) = int(n(t)/(M + 1)) for m = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1 and nM(t) = n(t) −∑M−1
m=0 nm(t) for m = M . The dynamic in the number of pirates is described by kt =
s
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ) Cm(τ). Starting values are Cm(0) = 0 for all m and kp,0 = 0.
We note that kt = s
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ) Cm(τ). The expression 5 for maximisation may be
considered a weighted sum of the per period sales, where the weights are themselves en-
dogenously defined as the legal sellers’ current shares. The per period sales are constrained
by the emergence of capacity. This interpretation helps to clarify the subsequent role of
piracy, which reduces the weights over time and whose effect depends on the possible set
of sales.
We conclude our model presentation by noting its relation to models of information
diffusion by central broadcasting (Geroski, 2000). Under central broadcasting, a single
source transmits information about the product to a fixed proportion of non-owners, who
can then buy it. The relation between past and new acquisitions in central broadcasting
is similar to that in our model through the assumption of delayed purchase. In any time
period, the construction of links over a proportion of non-owners in the central broadcasting
corresponds to partial use of links for sales in our model. In both models, the partial link
employment controls the rate of sales and thereby influences diffusion pace. We could, at
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the cost of sacrificing our economic explanation of delays, use an assumption on linking
consistent with broadcasting from all present users rather than a central source (as in the
Givon et al. (1995) model which has both central and current user broadcasting). The
alteration would not change the validity of the other model assumptions on reduction of
legal shares by piracy and on dynamic programming of the objective function.
3 Numerical analysis
We seek to solve equation 5 for the decision sequence of the legal sellers. For a particular
parameter set, the solution will give us a price sequence. We can then calculate sales pat-
terns and welfare, and perform comparative analyses and alter assumptions. Prior work
on diffusion in the presence of piracy has used various methods of solution. In Givon
et al. (1995) and Givon et al. (1997) a full deterministic diffusion pattern can be generated
by iteration on their difference equations. Liu et al. (2011) use exhaustive search to find
optimal prices in their iterative model. Prasad and Mahajan (2003) form the Hamiltonian
for a legal seller’s problem, and proceed to partial analytical solution expressing recursive
forms for price and piracy protection. Numerical solution and recursion is used to find
value maximising sequences for various parameter values. Khouja and Smith (2007) give
an explicit algebraic solution for price. None of these methods is perfect for our problem
with heterogeneous consumers. Nair (2007) and Liu (2010) face dynamic pricing prob-
lems similar to ours with such consumers. However, they either specify infinite timescale
problems and can use Bellman iteration (Nair, 2007) or work with what turns our to be
a relatively low dimensional problem (Liu, 2010). Again, their methods are not entirely
suitable for our problem.
3.1 Our estimation method
We investigate the theoretical properties of the model by solving the legal seller’s problem
through exhaustive search of pricing sequences with tracking of demand structure. We
calculate the properties over a five year period with annual price setting and monthly
emergence of capacity. These time parameters are set for practical and empirical rea-
sons. The annual pricing is intended to reflect the persistence of prices due to contractual
agreements, menu costs, and the increase in option values of delaying purchase (so damp-
ening the effectiveness of a price change). When we have a five year horizon, the number
of numerical calculations required by our solution algorithm is relatively limited and the
solution is quick.
We take five years as the lifetime of our information good, following Liu et al. (2011) on
software products. There are three parameters that vary in the model for the purposes of
comparative theoretical analysis. The first is the piracy rate s expressing the sales captured
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by current pirates as a proportion of past sales. The second parameter is the proportion
q of potential buyers who buy in the current month when the market has an offer price
below their valuation price for the good. The third is the demand elasticity a. We can
also vary the changes in market capacity.
For a given parameter set, the legal sellers’ problem is solved to give a sequence of
prices as the control variable and a sequence of sales as the response variable. We solve the
problem by a dynamic programming algorithm over the five year period. The algorithm
tracks the price sequences that lead to the highest discounted sales value. At each time
period, the possible non-user distributions at the start of the period are found by taking the
possible distributions at the end of the previous period and adding capacity newly emerging
in the period. The capacity increase is spread evenly over all five valuation points, and
increases at the specified speed. For each distribution at the start of the period, new
distributions are generated by having the legal sellers offer to sell at each possible price.
The possible prices at the start of each year are the valuation prices plus a higher price
corresponding to no sales, and for all other months are constrained to be the previous
month’s price. At each price and each starting distribution, the specified proportion of
non-users at each valuation level exceeding the price buys the good and leaves the non-user
distribution. Each resulting distribution has an associated price sequence comprising the
price sequence associated with the preceding distribution together with the present price,
and a sales sequence generated similarly. We iterate over all periods to obtain final price
and sales sequences after five years. The sequence of numbers of pirate sellers is calculated
as the specified proportion s of the one period lagged cumulative sales sequence. We retain
the pair with the highest discounted sales value, giving the optimal price choices of the
legal sellers. Discounted sales values to the legal sellers are calculated as the discounted
legal sales values, where legal sales are the legal share of total sales divided between legal
and pirate sellers. A numerical device for obtaining the same end result with less memory
requirements is used, whereby at the end of each period we only retain the sequence pairs
with the highest discounted values for each non-user distribution, as any later sequences
with these subsequences within them will have a higher discounted value than the same
later sequences with the subsequences replaced by lower value subsequences with the same
terminating distribution.
In all solutions we hold the monthly discount factor d constant at a rate of 1/1.01,
equivalent to annual discounting of 12.7 percent per year. The current period share of
potentially surplus increasing purchases, q, is held at one until we examine its comparative
effect. The capacity growth is specified to be zero or a positive constant, while the elasticity
a is fixed at one until we examine its comparative effect. We use five valuation points on
the discretised demand distribution (M = 5).
The estimation was implemented in the R programming language (R Development Core
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Team, 2009). The code is available from the author’s website 1.
4 Pricing with fixed capacity
4.1 Pricing
Figure 1: Price variation as a function of the piracy rate with fixed capacity. The rates are 0 (top left),
0.000025 (top right), 0.0001 (middle left), 0.0002 (middle right), and 0.0003 (bottom).
Figure 1 shows how dynamic prices change as the piracy rate rises, when market capacity
is held constant at 100,000. In the top left graph, there is no piracy. Prices decline four
1http://ebasic.easily.co.uk/02E044/05304E/pricing info goods.html
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times, between every period, as the legal seller sells to each valuation band in turn. Demand
is fully met in the final period as prices reach the lowest valuation band. The top right
graph shows pricing at a slightly higher rate of piracy, so that when all demand has been
met in the market, piracy’s effect is equivalent to sharing sales with 100000×0.000025 = 2.5
other identical legal sellers. There are three price declines, with the lowest valuation band
and market exhaustion reached one year earlier. The initial price is the highest valuation
band. In the final period, the company faces no demand and exits the market. Piracy
is increased further in the middle left graph, reaching the equivalent of sharing with ten
legal sellers. There are just two price declines at the end of the first two years, falling
from the highest valuation band to the lowest in year three. The legal seller then exits
the exhausted market. In the middle right graph, piracy’s effect reaches the equivalent
of dividing revenue with twenty other legal sellers when all market demand is met. The
pricing strategy is again a two step reduction in prices from the highest to lowest valuation
band. The intermediate price choice is lower, however, so that more of the market demand
is captured by the end of the second period. Piracy reaches the equivalent of thirty legal
sellers in the bottom graph. Prices fall from the highest to the lowest valuation band after
the first period, followed by market exit from the third period onwards. Considering all the
graphs together, we see that pricing always starts at the highest valuation band, it finishes
in the lowest band with all demand satisfied, and price changes become more compressed
near the start of the period as piracy increases.
We can rationalise the observations by reference to the legal seller’s profit maximisa-
tion. In the absence of piracy, the company can extract all surplus from the market by
charging each buyer their highest willingness to pay. The company can do so by practicing
intertemporal price discrimination. If discounting is not excessive relative to the gains of
intertemporal price discrimination - that is, relative to the gap between valuation bands -
then skimming will be practiced, as shown in the first graph.
As the piracy rate increases, pirates will emerge as competitors in proportion to the
number of owners. So sales made in months after earlier sales periods will be reduced in
value. The value of strategies that spread sales over long periods, including intertemporal
price discrimination, will decline relative to the value of strategies that concentrate sales
over smaller timescales. Selecting an optimal pricing strategy balances the returns from
intertemporal price discrimination against the losses due to piracy. We can see the selection
in the graphs in figure 1. Price changes are increasingly concentrated over smaller periods
and large price changes occur earlier. The timing of the compressed price changes is
determined by the discounting making early sales more valuable to the company than
late sales. The bottom graph (with the highest piracy rate) shows pricing consistent with
maximising value from sales in the first year followed by capturing whatever residual value
remains in the second year.
Our finding of increased price compression in response to piracy also occurs in Khouja
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and Smith (2007), where they work with a linear demand function and a similar skimming
and piracy mechanism to ours. In Liu et al. (2011), prices reduce to capture more current
sales when faced with increased piracy. In Prasad and Mahajan (2003), piracy tolerance
endogenously controls the importance of piracy. Higher tolerance is associated with higher
prices, with either piracy or low prices able to facilitate accelerated diffusion. The shape of
the price sequence is unchanged by changing tolerance, with prices always first increasing
then decreasing over time.
4.2 Mean sales time
Figure 2: Mean sales time with fixed capacity: time of launch (black serrated line), mean sales time after
launch (red dotted line), and total mean sales time (green dot-dash line) as functions of the piracy rate
With fixed capacity and positive discounting, piracy leads to earlier and steeper price
declines than under intertemporal price discrimination. Such pricing strategies accelerate
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sales. We can quantify the acceleration in response to piracy by examining the mean time
for sales,
T∑
t=1
tSt/
T∑
t=1
St (6)
where St are the total sales at time t. The formula only includes sales made during the
product life. When sales satisfy all market demand, the mean times for sales and diffusion
coincide. However, as we will shortly see instances in which diffusion is incomplete and
the mean time for diffusion is infinite, we consider the mean time for sales instead.
The mean time for sales may be decomposed into time until product launch and mean
sales time after launch, in the form
T∑
t=1
(t− L)St/
T∑
t=1
St + L (7)
where L is the launch time, that is, the first period of sales.
We calculate the launch time and post-launch mean sales time for piracy rates between
0 and 0.0003. The results are shown in figure 2. The launch time is always the first month,
so the total and post launch mean sales times are just shifted by a single month. They
reduce quickly as the piracy rate rises, with slightly faster decline at low rates.
The finding that piracy accelerates diffusion is common in the literature. For example,
in Liu et al. (2011), higher piracy reduces the ability of legal sellers to extract profits by
high prices because of switching. So prices reduce and sales accelerate. Givon et al. (1995)
suggest that piracy can accelerate legal sales (and by extension, total sales) although this
is a result of a relaxation of a parameter constraint making pirate and legal acquisitions
perfect substitutes that applies in their main model. Prasad and Mahajan (2003) present
a model similar to Givon et al. (1995), but with control over parameters by prices and
anti-piracy measures, and piracy acquisitions strictly supplemental to legal sales rather
than contemporaneously replacing them. When piracy is present, it accelerates sales in
their monopolistic analysis with plausible parameter values (although it is not clear that
sales are accelerated for all parameter values).
4.3 Welfare
We now examine welfare. A small number of researchers have looked at how piracy affects
welfare in a dynamic framework. Khouja et al. (2008) observe that the total number of
sales for any level of piracy is close to the total market capacity, so pirate sales compensate
for restrictions on acquisitions due to legal prices. Although the authors do not note it,
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profit maximisation by legal sellers would tend to exhaust market capacity independent
of pirate influence, as it is suboptimal to leave many goods unsold. The authors do not
calculate discounted welfare although their model allows it, which would be informative
about the effects of pirates. In Herings et al. (2009), the cost of pirate copying declines
directly with the number of copiers. Discouraging piracy by increasing its cost reduces
welfare. The authors do not present the dynamic patterns of emergence.
We saw in the last subsection that in our model, as sales are accelerated by piracy, the
value people derive from them should be discounted less, and so welfare should increase.
The changing pricing strategy may also be expected to change the division of welfare
between company and buyer. We divide welfare into profits, consumer surplus, and pirate
charges. As it is assumed that profits and charges are net of production costs, pirate
charges are surplus captured by producers of the pirate good. We could include non-zero
and differential production costs in the model, but the analysis would move us away from
timing issues in welfare and towards other theoretical mechanisms (Besen, 1986; Johnson,
1985; Belleflamme, 2002; Bae and Choi, 2006).
We have seen that the formula for a company’s discounted profits is given by equation
5,
T∑
t=1
dt
k1 + kt
p(t)q
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (8)
Thus, the total discounted profits across all companies are
T∑
t=1
dt
k1
k1 + kt
q
∑
m∈mp(t)
p(t)Cm(t) (9)
The total charge of acquisition from pirate sources is
T∑
t=1
dt
kt
k1 + kt
q
∑
m∈mp(t)
p(t)Cm(t) (10)
Then the total cost of adoption from any source is the sum of equations 9 and 10, or
T∑
t=1
dtq
∑
m∈mp(t)
p(t)Cm(t) (11)
The total gross value derived from adoption from either legal or pirate sources is the
same as the total welfare. Sales occur for buyers with willingness to buy of (M/m)1/a if
and only if (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t). Thus, the formula for discounted total value derived from
sales (and hence total welfare) is
13
T∑
t=1
dtq
∑
m∈mp(t)
(M/m)1/aCm(t) (12)
Total consumer surplus is the difference between total welfare in equation 12 and total
acquisition costs in equation 11, or
T∑
t=1
dtq
∑
m∈mp(t)
((M/m)1/a − p(t))Cm(t) (13)
Figure 3: Welfare with fixed capacity: consumer surplus (blue horizontal stripes), pirate charges (red
vertical stripes), and legal seller profits (green slanting stripes) as functions of the piracy rate
Figure 3 shows welfare and its components as a function of the piracy rate. As expected,
total welfare rises as piracy does due to the reduced discounting. The welfare rise is much
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gentler than the decline in sales time, as most sales acceleration is to buyers with lower
valuations. In the mean sales time calculation, only the number of sales matter, whereas
in the welfare calculation the valuations are included. The rise in welfare is quite linear.
Profits account for the entire surplus when piracy is zero as perfect skimming is prac-
ticed. When the piracy rate increases a little, profits drop sharply as companies begin
to share our their profits with small number of pirates over most of their extended sales
strategy. As the piracy rate rises, the number of pirating agents who share the income in-
creases linearly, so the legal shares decline inverse proportionally and by smaller amounts.
Moreover, price changes are highly compressed in time at the higher rates of piracy, so
that increases in piracy act over small periods of time.
As the piracy rate rises from zero, pirate charges rapidly increase their share of total
welfare. The rate of increase declines over time, and the share reaches its maximum value
at a rate of 0.00022. A general small trend to increase persists thereafter. However, there
are large periodic downward corrections in the share of piracy as the rate rises, as these
are substantial at higher rates. As a result, pirate charges fall at higher rates.
At low levels of piracy, pricing strategy mainly adjusts the prices later in the product
life because earlier adjustment reduces the extent of intertemporal price discrimination
excessively. So pirate charges are a share of sales at the time when prices are higher, during
the early skimming, and so are quite a large part of total welfare. As piracy increases,
it becomes optimal for legal sellers to reduce prices earlier on, and so pirate providers
capture lower shares of total welfare. At the highest levels of piracy, the compression of
price reductions is so heavy that total pirate charges fall as the pricing strategy changes.
Consumer surplus is zero at the lowest rates of piracy. It increases by steps as the rate
rises, with the surplus on average following a roughly linear trend. At the higher rates of
piracy it accounts for a little less than pirate charges, and around a third of profits.
When the piracy rate is low, perfect intertemporal price discrimination extracts all
profits from consumers. The surplus extraction rises as the piracy rate increases and
pricing strategy departs from skimming. The departures become more infrequent as the
piracy rate rises, but the price reductions are steeper, so we see the general linear drift in
welfare over time.
We summarise the preferences for piracy rates by the market participants when market
capacity is fixed. Legal sellers prefer no piracy as they can extract the entire market
surplus. Pirate providers prefer a moderately high rate where they are capturing as much
of the market as possible without triggering legal sellers to reduce prices too steeply and
early and leave the pirate providers with few and low valuing buyers. Consumers like
piracy as high as possible because of the price reductions entailed by piracy prevention.
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5 Pricing with capacity growth
5.1 Pricing
Figure 4: Price variation as a function of piracy in the presence of capacity drift. The rates are 0 (top
left), 0.00006 (top right), 0.00007 (middle left), 0.00009 (middle right), and 0.0006 (bottom).
In this section, we examine pricing in the presence of piracy when market capacity starts
at zero and increases by 1000 every month. Figure 4 shows the pricing strategy as the
piracy rate rises. In the top left graph, piracy is zero, and prices are held at the highest
consumer valuation until two years remain. Then prices are reduced twice, firstly to the
second highest valuation and then to the lowest. In the top right graph, the piracy rate
increases so that there are pirate providers equivalent to 60× 1000× 0.000006 = 3.6 legal
sellers by the end of the product life. The pricing adjusts in the first year so that the legal
seller delays its market entry. In the middle left graph the piracy rate rises slightly to be
equivalent to an ending 4.2 legal senders, and the product launch is delayed for another
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year. The middle right graph has an ending number of pirates equivalent to 6.3 legal
sellers. A further launch delay is observed, and the final price drop is steeper from the
highest valuation to the lowest valuation. In the bottom graph, piracy ends up equivalent
to 36 legal sellers. The legal seller holds launch until the last year, and then keeps prices
at the highest valuation.
When there is no piracy, the explanation for the pricing is that the legal seller attempts
to extract as much available surplus as possible. In the first few years, they sell only at the
top valuation price and so capture all surplus from the top valuers. As the market capacity
is growing, the consumers in the top valuation band are replaced and surplus can continue
being extracted from them. However, the number of consumers in lower valuation bands
also grows and it enhances profits to sell to them after a time. The timing is influenced
by the remaining product duration.
For non-zero piracy, the early sales increase the number of pirates who share later rev-
enues. There is an increase in the value of strategies that compress price reductions relative
to strategies that stagger them, which we again see in the graphs with the compression
becoming acuter as the piracy rate rises. The timing of the compression is due to the
capacity trend. Early sales would capture little of the total capacity emergent over the
whole product lifetime, but would expose the legal seller to piracy when capacity is much
larger. So it is optimal to delay the compression until later in the period, with the delay
rising with the piracy rate. At the highest rate of piracy, entry is delayed until the last year
and just one year of revenue is earned. The highest price is chosen, but the company’s
profits are actually unchanged by other prices given unitary demand elasticity and the
single period selection.
We can examine the relation between piracy and the growth of capacity by referring
again to the legal seller’s optimisation problem. A change in the constant growth rate of
capacity alters nm(t) to anm(t) for some constant a and all t. Since the valuation bands
evolve under Cm(t + 1) = (1 − q)Cm(t) + nm(t) if (M/m)1/a ≥ p(t) and Cm(t + 1) =
Cm(t) + nm(t) otherwise, Cm(t) is also scaled up by a factor of a for all t and m. Further,
as pirate sales are proportional to past sales, kt = s
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ) Cm(τ) and so kt is
also increased by a factor of a. Inserting these adjusted functional forms in maximised
expression 5, we have
T∑
t=1
dt
k1 + as
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ) Cm(τ)
p(t)qa
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (14)
We can write s′ = as to describe a piracy rate rescaled by a. The a in the denominator
can be factored out of the objective function entirely and so does not affect decision making.
Thus, the effect of a change in the constant rate of capacity growth on diffusion is the same
as a change in the piracy rate, up to a rescaling of the diffusion curve.
17
Another way of expressing the result is that piracy is a share of past sales, so the effect
on piracy of a scaling in sales is equivalent to an increase in the share of pirate sales out
of past sales. All income is directly rescaled by the same factor, so doesn’t affect the legal
seller’s decision making. Thus, a rescaled capacity growth is equivalent to a piracy rate
change for decision making, and an equivalent rescaling for the overall income. The result
is shown graphically in figure 5 2. Curve C1 traces total capacity at one rate of emergence
and curve C2 traces capacity emerging at a rate a times higher. The sales path O1 is
optimal out of many possible paths, with the sum of points on the path giving the sales
path’s value to the company. Rescaling piracy by 1/a and increasing capacity by a maps
the set of possible sales paths for C1 to the set for C2. Thus, the optimal sales path O2
is just the optimal sales path O1 scaled upwards by a at the revised piracy rate.
Figure 5: Optimal sales paths for capacity emergence curves. Sales path O1 corresponds to capacity
emergence curve C1, and O2 (= a×O1) corresponds to capacity emergence curve C2 (= a×C1). The
piracy rate for the second curve is a times lower than for the first curve.
5.2 Mean sales time
Figure 6 shows the mean total sales time as a function of the piracy rate, divided into
the time until launch and mean sales time after launch. The total sales time increases a
little as the piracy rate increases, undergoing small jumps as the market entry date shifts
backwards. The launch date is delayed heavily by rises in the piracy rate. Its movement
alternates between large jumps and long periods of no change. The post-launch mean sales
time displays the opposite movement. There is initially a long sales time, but the time
falls to almost zero at the maximum piracy rate.
2Thanks to Paul Fenn for suggesting a graphical interpretation.
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Figure 6: Mean sales time with rising capacity: time of launch (black serrated line), mean sales time after
launch (red dotted line), and total mean sales time (green dot-dash line) as functions of the piracy rate
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When we examined sales times for the fixed capacity market, the post-launch sales
time also declined with rising piracy. However, the launch time remained the same for all
piracy rates, in contrast to the increasing capacity case here. The differences in launch
time explain the divergent findings on mean total sales time.
5.3 Welfare
Figure 7: Welfare with rising capacity: consumer surplus (blue horizontal stripes), pirate charges (red
vertical stripes), and legal seller profits (green slanting stripes) as functions of the piracy rate
Figure 7 shows total welfare as a function of the piracy rate, decomposed into consumer
surplus, pirate charges, and legal seller profits. The total welfare declines over time, with
three minor declines in welfare and a single very large one. Welfare is unchanging for most
rates. Company profits decline rapidly when the piracy rate first starts to increase and
slows down subsequently, as profits are inversely related to the number of pirating agents.
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Pirate charges are subject to a general increase that is initially rapid and then slows,
as the rate of substitution for legal sales declines. However, pirate charges undergo four
downward revisions of increasing magnitude as the piracy rate increases, with the final
revision eradicating most of the pirate charges. The first three declines are due to com-
pression, while the final delay is due to compression and truncation of sales at the end of
the product life.
Consumer surplus reduces very slightly as the piracy rate rises through very low levels,
with the product launch being delayed without the subsequent pricing changing. As the
rate rises a little further, there is a large increase in welfare as price changes are compressed
and more surplus is transferred from providers to buyers. The piracy rate then increases
considerably without any change in surplus, before surplus drops suddenly as the trunca-
tion of sales at the end of the product life means that many consumers never buy in the
market, even though they could do so at some price and create value for themselves, the
company, and pirate providers.
We can again order the preferences for piracy of the market participants based on the
welfare they derive. The legal seller prefers no piracy. Pirate providers prefer a high rate,
but are worst off at very high rates. Piracy rates that extract the maximum surplus for
them are just below the non-zero rates that give them minimal surplus. Consumers are
indifferent to any rates that are not too low or too high. They are also worst off with very
high rates.
Preferences for small changes in piracy rates depend on the current rate. At low rates,
it is in the interest of pirate providers to increase rates slightly but against the interest of
consumers. At slightly higher rates, consumers benefit from small increases in piracy rates
but pirate providers suffer. Often consumers are indifferent but pirate providers benefit,
while around one particular rate they both suffer considerably from a small increase.
Our analysis of welfare indicates the presence of a trade-off due to piracy. Previous work
has examined other ambiguities in the effect of piracy on welfare, and the distributional
consequences. Besen (1986) and Besen and Kirby (1989) consider circumstances in which
different productive efficiencies of legal and pirate copies can result in welfare increases
from piracy. Johnson (1985), Novos and Waldman (1984), and Yoon (2002) allow for the
possibility that pirate copies may be more inefficient in production but change market
access through lower purchase costs. Short term welfare increases from expanded use
but reduced long term welfare from legal production disincentivisation is examined in
Belleflamme (2002) and Cremer and Pestieau (2009). Takeyama (1994) consider welfare
changes when piracy can expand user networks.
Our model identifies a dynamic trade-off. Total welfare increases with the piracy rate
when capacity is constant, while it declines with the piracy rate when capacity is rising.
The different welfare outcomes indicate the presence of two competing mechanisms that
are differentially activated by the choice of capacity trend. On one hand, piracy induces
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compression of price changes that accelerates sales and increases welfare. On the other
hand, piracy increases the product launch delay in the presence of a capacity trend, so
decelerating sales. If the piracy rate or capacity growth are very high, product launch may
be so delayed that some consumers do not buy the product before it becomes obsolescent.
6 Modifying influences
This section considers factors that modify piracy’s effect on pricing. We vary either the
parameters previously held constant, or one of the model assumptions. We start by looking
at the impact of purchase delay, then demand elasticity, transient heterogeneity, network
effects, and uncertainty.
6.1 Purchase delay
Figure 8: Price variation as a function of purchase delay in the presence of piracy. The piracy rate is
0.0001 and current acquisition shares are 1 (top left), 0.8 (top right), and 0.6 (bottom).
In this subsection, we introduce purchase delay into our model. With the earlier specifi-
cation, the q parameter is reduced below one. Figure 8 shows q parameters of one (top left
graph), 0.8 (top right graph), and 0.6 (bottom graph), with the piracy rate held constant
at 0.0001 and capacity fixed. As the purchase delay rises, there is less departure from
intertemporal price discrimination.
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The reversion to skimming can be explained by considering how the relative values of
current and future sales change when purchase delays are introduced. A proportion 1− q
of sales will be subject to competition from pirates, whereas it would not be if purchase
delays were absent. Thus, the value of current sales relative to future sales is lower for any
sales decision in the presence of piracy. As the size of the relative value of current sales
motivates the compression of sales, staggered sales are used until a much higher level of
piracy in the presence of purchase delay.
6.2 Demand elasticity
Figure 9: Price variation as a function of demand elasticity in the presence of piracy. The elasticities are
1.3 (top left), 1.1 (top right), 1 (middle left), 0.9 (middle right), and 0.7 (bottom).
We next consider how piracy’s effect on pricing is affected by demand elasticity. In our
model specification, elasticity is represented by the parameter a which we set equal to 1.3,
1.1, 1, 0.9, and 0.7 in turn. The piracy rate is set at 0.0001 with fixed capacity. Figure 9
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shows the optimal price sequences.
In the top left graph the elasticity is 1.3. The legal seller sets their price at the lowest
buyer valuation and sells immediately to the whole market. In the top right graph, the
elasticity is 1.1 and the prices start at the highest valuation in year one before dropping to
the lowest valuation in year two. The remaining graphs show that as the elasticity drops
further, increased staggering of price declines occurs with market exhaustion happening
one period later in each graph.
The behaviour can be explained by looking at the prices where demand is concentrated.
With elastic demand, demand is concentrated at low prices so the gap between the high
and low valuation bands (which have equal density of consumers) is small. So the gains
of skimming are limited relative to the cost of piracy, and selling as quickly as possible is
most profitable. When demand is inelastic, demand is more concentrated at high prices
and the gains of skimming are larger. So skimming is practiced despite piracy.
6.3 Transient heterogeneity
In the introduction, we noted that many papers (Haruvy et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2011;
Prasad and Mahajan, 2003) in pirate diffusion analysis have assumed no or transient
heterogeneity in consumer demand. In this section, we see what the effect is of removing
persistence in heterogeneity from our model. To do so, we adjust our model so that after
any sales, the remaining non-users are redistributed evenly in the next month over all
valuations. We then run the model for various piracy rates and with fixed capacity.
We do not show any graphs, as a single simple behaviour was exhibited. We find
that prices remain at the highest valuation whenever there are any non-users and for all
rates of piracy. The reason is that in any period with a dispersion over every valuation
in the demand function, lower prices do not increase revenue in that period because of
unitary elasticity, and they lower the size of the future market (despite the piracy that will
reduce the legal seller’s access to that market). With transient heterogeneity the demand
function is recycled every month, so the argument applies repeatedly and prices remain at
the highest valuation.
6.4 Network demand externalities
In this subsection we examine how network demand externalities affect piracy’s effect. In
both the static and dynamic literature, it is recognised that when there are externalities,
piracy can act as a means of reaching a market size offering network gains without having
to use low prices to do so. The freedom to increase prices can increase legal seller profits
(Takeyama, 1994; Haruvy et al., 2004).
We assume that the number of current users of the good increases the value of adoption
to non-users, where the increase is described by a multiplier linear in the number of current
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Figure 10: Price variation as a function of the network parameter in the presence of piracy. The network
parameters are 0 (top left), 0.000005 (top right), and 0.00001 (bottom), and the piracy rate is 0.0001.
users. Using the notation of section 2.2, their valuations at time t are equal to their initial
valuations times a factor of 1+fSt, where f is a constant and St =
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
m∈mp(τ) Cm(τ).
We continue to discretise the prices, and the initial valuation bands with values of (M/m)1/a
for some m ∈ 1, . . . ,M map to valuation bands at time t with values of (M/m)1/a(1+fSt).
The legal seller continues to set prices at the start of each year. In between active price
setting, prices grow to remain in the same relative valuation band as it inflates with the
number of lagged sales. Legal sellers face the problem of setting prices p(t) in a revised
objective function of
T∑
t=1
dt
1 + kt
p(t)(1 + fSt)q
∑
m∈mp(t)
Cm(t) (15)
If the piracy rate s is equal to the network parameter f , all sales values are inflated
by a network effect and all values are deflated by an exactly equal piracy effect. So sales
values in response to pricing decisions expressed in the non-inflated prices are the same as
if neither effect was present. Hence pricing decisions expressed in the non-inflated prices
are the same as if both were set at zero.
When the piracy rate and network parameter differ, we can solve for the price sequence
p(t) using the method described in section 3. For ease of comparability of the pricing
structures before and after network effects we show the choices of price before inflation for
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network effects. Figure 10 shows pricing when the piracy rate is held at 0.0001, capacity
is fixed, and the network parameter takes the values of 0, 0.000005, and 0.00001.
The top left graph shows moderate compression of price changes in the absence of any
network effects. As the network parameter rises to a twentieth of the piracy rate in the top
right graph, skimming lasts a further period. In the bottom graph the network parameter
reaches a tenth of the piracy rate, and there is no compression and pricing follows the
pattern of intertemporal price discrimination.
The pricing effect of piracy is very sensitive to the presence of network externalities.
We can see the reason by considering the joint adjustment factor at time t due to piracy
and network externalities in equation 15, which is
1 + fSt
1 + sSt
(16)
after noting that kt = sSt and that s is the piracy rate. We can solve for an equivalent
piracy rate e in the absence of network externalities by equating expression 16 to 1/(1 + e)
to give
e =
s− f
1 + fSt
(17)
For s = 0.0001 and f = 0.00001, e ≈ s for St = 0 when the product is newly launched,
while e ≈ s/2 for St = 100000 when the market is exhausted. The equivalent piracy
rate acting late in the diffusion is much reduced relative to that in the early diffusion,
so the benefit of price change compression relative to skimming is much less. A network
parameter only a tenth of the piracy rate can substantially reduce the compression due to
piracy.
6.5 Uncertainty
Until now we have assumed that capacity growth is deterministic. In this subsection, we
examine the effect of an anticipated shock on pricing. There is initially a capacity of 100000
that is only changed by a shock occurring at the end of year three. The shock increases
capacity by 0 or 100000 with equal probability. The legal seller maximises their expected
discounted profit at all times.
We solve for the optimal pricing scheme as in section 3 by assuming that the shock takes
the low value and calculating the profits emerging from every possible pricing strategy.
We retain the pricing sequences for years four and five that give the highest discounted
(deterministic) value for each possible sequence in years one to three. The solution and
retention are then repeated assuming the shock takes the high value. For each sequence
for years one to three, we average the discounted deterministic values for the optimal price
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Figure 11: Price variation as a function of piracy in the presence of a capacity shock. The black dashed
lines show pricing before and after a high shock, while the red dotted lines show pricing before and after a
low shock. The piracy rates are 0 (top left), 0.000025 (top right), 0.0001 (bottom left), and 0.0003 (bottom
right).
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sequences from the low and high sequences, and keep the two sequences (one for the low
and one for the high shock) sharing the first three years’ prices and with the highest mean
value.
Figure 11 shows prices before and after low and high shocks on the same graphs. The
top left graph has no piracy. Perfect intertemporal price discrimination is practiced until
the shock. After a low shock, the skimming continues as before. After a high shock, prices
rise to sell to the newly entered highest valuing consumers, before falling to the lowest
rate. The top right graph has a piracy rate of 0.000025. Before the shock, prices start off
at the highest valuation before falling to the next highest valuation and remaining there
until the shock. Thus, there is a departure from skimming. After the shock, pricing is the
same as in the absence of piracy. The bottom left graph shows pricing when the piracy
rate is 0.0001. The same pricing before the shock is observed as for the previous graph.
After a high shock the same pricing is again observed, but after a low shock prices fall
immediately to the lowest valuation followed by market exit in the last period. In the
bottom right graph, the piracy rate is 0.0003. Before the shock, the price is held at the
highest valuation. After it, there are steep price declines, with some limited skimming
being practiced after a high shock alone.
The deterministic analysis of pricing after the shock is familiar from the earlier analysis.
Intertemporal price discrimination is optimal if there is no piracy, or if there are large
valuation differences among consumers. Piracy compresses price changes.
The analysis of expected value pricing prior to the shock has to consider the effect of
piracy after the shock. Without piracy, a pricing strategy to extract value from capacity
available in the period prior to the shock does not reduce the value of a strategy to extract
value from capacity emerging from the shock. However, with piracy a pricing strategy in
the first three years can reduce the value of a strategy applicable to capacity emerging from
the shock, as it may alter the number of pirates present after the shock. The reduction
would be more severe if the piracy rate is higher. It is therefore beneficial to wait to see
whether a high or low shock occurs, and adjust strategy accordingly. Thus, when piracy
is higher there are fewer price reductions prior to the shock.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have specified a model of pricing in the presence of piracy and with
heterogeneous consumers. Piracy is found to lower the profitability of a skimming strategy
in favour of a compressed price reduction scheme. In a fixed capacity market, piracy
increases welfare, but in a growing market it reduces welfare. The optimal piracy rate
choices of consumers, pirate providers, and legal sellers do not generally coincide.
Piracy is found to trade off two effects on sales time and welfare in the presence of mar-
ket capacity growth, by both delaying product launch and accelerating subsequent sales.
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Further work could clarify the mechanisms algebraically and classify them among other
possible ones with related impact. Among the possible modifications could be allowance
of a role for information spreading as in Givon et al. (1995), consideration of the impact
of partial transfer of product value forward after the end of its lifetime, and inclusion of
incentives to innovate if they enter in an analytically substantial way.
We examined uncertainty briefly. More work could examine alternative distributional
forms and uncertainty on variables other than capacity. Diffusion timing and welfare
consequences could be examined as well. Our model differs from earlier work in assuming
persistence in consumer heterogeneity and an increasing marginal propensity to pirate.
Both could be tested. For the second of the two assumptions, our recent work (Waters,
2013) provides some evidence that the propensity does increase with the number of users.
Our model is highly stylised, and the assumptions of no rival entry and non-competitive
pricing for pirate copies could be relaxed for a more realistic model. The model could then
be tested quantitatively or qualitatively. For all the model’s stylisation, it seems reasonable
that some of its principal predictions would hold even in its current form. For example, a
company would feasibly delay a product launch in a developing country prone to piracy
until the market was large enough to gain short term profits from entry.
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